

FH#394

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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1. The new collectivization project is the best indication of the difficulties the regime has in fulfilling the agricultural plan. The poor management of the kolkhozes, which has produced many sessions of "self criticism", has forced the government to tighten the control of agriculture in order to prevent the deepening of the catastrophic position of agriculture and to fix responsibilities. The situation is to be rectified by an increase in the tempo of collectivization. The regime has reached the decision that complete collectivization is the "best possible solution for the land-laborer class."
2. A brief analysis of the project, however, demonstrates that this best possible solution is only another means of getting the peasant's property in land, animals and products away from him. Article 4 makes this quite clear. It says: "On entering into a collective, the member will bring with him everything on the land."
3. The peasant will practically never be able to get anything back, although article 17 of the project states that the peasant who wishes to leave a kolkhoz will receive compensation for everything he brought. The project contains a whole list of cases in which the seizure of peasant property takes place without compensation. In addition to his landed property the peasant must bring his implements, his tools, his stores of seed, his animals and their fodder. That is, the state, which has been unable to supply the kolkhozes with the necessary implements, is trying to extract them from the independent peasantry.
4. Article 12 eliminates kulaks from the collective farms, and takes in non-landowning peasants. In reality the regime is interested only in the kulaks as they are the only ones possessing the necessary agricultural equipment.

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5. Article 14 concerns the peasants who have sold their animals or seed stocks in the last two years. This is quite common in Rumania, where many have had to sell everything they owned to meet the high quotas demanded by the state. The peasant who enters a collective without bringing anything with him is required to work long enough to "pay his debt." As acceptance into a kolkhoz is treated as a privilege, an entrance tax of 50 lei is placed on those joining.
6. Articles 21 and 22 state that half of what any joiner brings with him becomes part of the general indivisible basis funds of the farm.
7. The state maintains the tax in kind system on the collectives. The machine and tractor centers have a claim on part of the production. A reserve of 10 to 15 percent is to be held for seed and fodder for the coming year, and this is naturally at the disposal of the state. A further reserve of two percent is to be set aside in good years to make up for bad ones.
8. Articles 22 and 23 provide that a fixed portion of the production must go to the state, the cooperatives or the market of the collective farms. After these quotas are met the remainder of the production is to be divided among the members in proportion to the number of their working days. The minimum is 120 days in a year.

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